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I. INTRODUCTION
If justice were immediate, prejudgment interest would never be
awarded.' Justice, however, is not necessarily immediate: some parties
must endure years of litigation in order to obtain compensation for their
damages. 2 Because "compensation is a fundamental principal of dam-
ages" in litigation,3 varying types of interest may be awarded on such
damage awards in order to fully compensate an injured party.4 To be
sure, a sum of money today is not a complete substitute for the same
amount that should have been paid years ago.5 One type of interest that
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1. Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 294 (1996).
2. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d
1279, 1334 (7th Cir. 1992) (spanning approximately thirteen years of litigation).
3. Robertson Steel Co. v. Harrell, 177 F.2d 12, 17 (9th Cir. 1949); see also Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry. Co. v. Elk Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 30, 35 (5th Cir. 1950); Emery v. Tile Roofing Co., 195 A. 409,
412 (N.H. 1937).
4. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995)
(discussing pre- and post-judgment interest).
5. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1331. "While inflation may offset the refusal
to discount damages for future losses to present value, that process does not affect the disparity
between a plaintiff who receives his trial and judgment the day after an injury and a plaintiff who
receives his judgment after years of protracted litigation." Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573,
576 (5th Cir. 1981).
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courts may award is prejudgment interest-interest awarded on a legal
judgment from the time the claim accrued until entry of that judgment.
6
Although interest is not intended as a windfall, 7 interest does serve
an integral purpose in judicial remedies. In fact, many areas of the law
award prejudgment interest as incident to a meritorious claim for dam-
ages.9 Moreover, prejudgment interest awards may be especially large-
in some cases even exceeding the value of the principal claim.10 For ex-
ample, the Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of more than $120,000,000
in prejudgment interest on a principal claim of $61,000,000.11 More re-
cently, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision awarding approximately
$5,300,000 in prejudgment interest on a principal claim of approximately
$1,670,000.12 Accordingly, in any case, prejudgment interest may be a
large, if not central, issue in litigation.
13
Moreover, in many cases both the plaintiff and the defendant assert
claims against each other, claims that may require awarding interest in
order to fully compensate the respective claimant. 14 Some of the oppos-
ing claims arise from the same contract or same operative facts, while
others arise from entirely separate, collateral matters. Based on various
factors discussed below, the relationship between these claims deter-
mines which claims receive interest awards and how those awards are
calculated vis-A-vis the opposing claims. 15 This Comment focuses on the
situation where a liquidated claim is opposed by an unliquidated counter-
claim. Although there are four different approaches to calculating pre-
judgment interest in this situation, 16 two are of central importance. First,
some states apply the "interest on the entire claim" or "interest on the
6. Knoll, supra note 1. See also discussion infra Part II.A.
7. Coleman Eng'g Co., Inc. v. N. Am. Aviation, Inc., 420 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1966).
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, 2000 WL 34508307, at *40 (U.S. 2000). "Many other areas of
law besides patent law, including contract, tort, insurance, admiralty, employment, securities, and
civil rights, also provide for prejudgment interest awards under both statutory and common-law
authority." Id. (internal citations omitted).
10. Id. at *42 (U.S. 2000). See also Osterneck v. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1536
( lIth Cir. 1987).
11. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279,
1331-37 (7th Cir. 1992).
12. City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194-99 (1995).
13. See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1330.
14. 1 DAN DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.6(1) (2d ed. 1993). See also discussion infra
Part lI.B.
15. See discussion infra Parts II.C, Ill.
16. The four approaches were as follows: (1) Interest on the Balance Rule; (2) Conversion of
Liquidated Claim Rule; (3) Interest on the Entire Claim Rule; and (4) Counterclaim as a Discount
Rule. Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 211-12 (8th Cir.
1969); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Klapal, 205 F. Supp. 388, 390-93 (Neb. 1962).
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whole" rule. 17 Under that rule, prejudgment interest is calculated and
awarded on the liquidated claim prior to deducting the opposing unliqui-
dated counterclaim. 18 Washington currently follows this rule.' 9
Second, some states apply the "interest on the balance" rule. 20 Un-
der that rule, interest is calculated and awarded only after deducting the
opposing unliquidated counterclaim. 21 Accordingly, the liquidated claim
is offset by the unliquidated claim prior to the calculation prejudgment
interest, if any, on the liquidated claim under the interest on the balance
rule.22
As noted above, Washington applies the interest on the entire claim
rule in calculating prejudgment interest offsets. 23 Although Washington
courts rarely permit the offset of an unliquidated counterclaim prior to
the calculation of prejudgment interest on a liquidated claim, this
Comment argues that Washington should adopt the interest on the bal-
ance rule when both claims arise out of the same transaction, contract, or
operative facts. Indeed, this rule is articulated by numerous treatises2
4
and followed in many states. 5
17. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 211; Socony Mobil Oil Co., 205 F. Supp. at 391-92;
Robblee v. Robblee, 68 Wash. App. 69, 81, 841 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1992).
18. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 211; Socony Mobil Oil Co., 205 F. Supp. at 391-92;
Robblee, 68 Wash. App. at 81, 841 P.2d at 1296.
19. See generally Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 273 P.2d 652
(1954).
20. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 211; Socony Mobil Oil Co., 205 F. Supp. at 390;
Robblee, 68 Wash. App. at 81, 841 P.2d at 1296.
21. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 211; Socony Mobil Oil Co., 205 F. Supp. at 390;
Robblee, 68 Wash. App. at 81, 841 P.2d at 1296.
22. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 211; Socony Mobil Oil Co., 205 F. Supp. at 390;
Robblee, 68 Wash. App. at 81, 841 P.2d at 1296.
23. See generally Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 158, 273 P.2d at 652.
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354(1) (1981). "If the breach consists
of a failure to pay a definite sum in money or to render a performance with fixed or ascertainable
monetary value, interest is recoverable from the time for performance on the amount due less all
deductions to which the party in breach is entitled." Id.
47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 50 (2005).
Ordinarily, where the amount of a demand is sufficiently certain to justify the allowance
of interest thereon, the existence of a setoff, counterclaim, or cross claim which is unliq-
uidated will not prevent the recovery of interest on the balance of the demand found due
from the time it became due, unless the plaintiffs liquidated claim is less than the award
to the defendant on his or her counterclaim.
Id. I DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1).
When the defendant's counterclaim or set-off is successful and reduces his liability for
reasons arising out of the same facts that give rise to the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff's
claim is still regarded as ascertainable and prejudgment interest still awarded, but in that
case interest is computed on the net amount the plaintiff recovers after crediting the de-
fendant.
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Following this introduction, Part II explores the nature and pur-
poses of prejudgment interest, focusing on the role that prejudgment in-
terest plays in a claimant's remedy or damage award and exploring the
historical distinction between liquidated and unliquidated claims. Part III
builds on this historical distinction by examining two different ap-
proaches for calculating prejudgment interest where a meritorious liqui-
dated claim is countered by a meritorious unliquidated counterclaim:
(1) the Washington rule, also known as the interest on the entire claim or
interest on the whole rule; and (2) the interest on the balance rule and its
slight variation in California, which focuses on the distinction between a
"payment" and a "discount". Based on those rules, Part IV argues that
(1) Washington's continued reliance on Mall Tool Co. v. Far West
Equip. Co.,26 which applied the interest on the whole rule except in a
very narrow situation,27 leads to unjust results in many cases; and (2) the
interest on the balance rule is the better reasoned approach. Finally, Part
V concludes that Washington should replace the rule established in Mall
Tool Co. with the interest on the balance rule for awarding and calculat-
ing prejudgment interest, thereby making interest on the whole the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
Id. 25 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 66:110 (4th ed.
2005) [hereinafter WILLISTON].
Interest will normally be awarded on a liquidated claim even though it is subject to an
unliquidated counterclaim or setoff. In such cases, the interest is generally computed on
the balance found to be due to the plaintiff, on the theory that he or she was deprived only
of this amount during the pendency of litigation.
Id.; Willett v. Schmeiser Mfg. Co., 255 P. 529, 531-32 (Cal. App. 1927) (as cited in York Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. Groussman Inv. Co., 443 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo. 1968)).
25. See, e.g., Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1299-1300
(11 th Cir. 2002); N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 1985) (rec-
ognizing Minnesota's interest on the balance rule); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng.
Corp., 444 F.2d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 1971); Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 212-13 (finding that it is
not abuse of discretion to award interest on the balance to the plaintiff even though the defendant's
counterclaim was not directly related to the plaintiffs claim); Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v. U.S. for the
Use of Oaks Constr. Co., 313 F.2d 119, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1963) (affirming the district court's award
of prejudgment interest on the balance); Homes & Son Constr. Co., Inc v. Bolo Corp., 526 P.2d
1258, 1261-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Waverly Taylor, Inc. v. Polinger, 583 A.2d 179, 184 (D.C.
1990); York Plumbing & Heating Co., 443 P.2d at 988; Farrington v. Freeman, 99 N.W.2d 388, 392
(Iowa 1959); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Bush, 490 P.2d 367, 370 (Kan. 1971) (finding that when "a
plaintiff sues for a liquidated sum and the defendant establishes an offsetting claim" the offset is to
be "credited against the liquidated claim" as of the due date of the original debt and the "balance
bears interest from that due date.") (internal citations omitted); Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 42 N.W.2d
720, 728 (Minn. 1950); Harmon Cable Commc'ns of Neb. LP v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468
N.W.2d 350, 371-72 (Neb. 1991); Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554-55
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960); H. & M. Heating Co. v. Andrae, 150 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Wis. 1967)
(reaffirming interest on the balance rule); Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981).
26.45 Wash. 2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
27. For example, interest on the balance rule may be applied only where the claims arise from
the same unitary contract. See id. at 664, 178-79. See also discussion infra Part III.A.
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II. THE NATURE AND PURPOSES OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST HISTORICALLY
A. The Historical Evolution of Interest
Interest is the sum of money paid or payable for the use or deten-
tion of money or property.28 Prejudgment interest, then, is interest that is
awarded as part of a judgment, but which is calculated to accrue prior to
the entry of that judgment.29 Although calculated on the total amount
awarded in a judgment, prejudgment interest runs only for, and with re-
spect to, some certain period prior to the entry of that judgment.3 ° This
timeframe distinguishes prejudgment interest from any other interest
awarded on the judgment, which runs from and after the entry thereof.3"
In general, prejudgment interest may be awarded from the date of a
breach of a contract,32 commission of a tort,3 3 or in some cases, the
commencement of the lawsuit.
34
Historically, societal prejudice and religious beliefs condemned the
payment of interest as usury. As a result, interest was awarded to a meri-
torious claimant only in a limited number of circumstances and then only
in the discretion of the jury.35 Interest was "an abhorrence to the law, and
a contract therefor was not only not enforceable, but criminal., 36 By the
nineteenth century, however, American courts awarded interest, but only
28. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1).
29. See id.
30. J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Allowance of Prejudgment Interest On Builder's Recovery in
Action for Breach of Construction Contract, 60 A.L.R.3d 487 n.1 (1974).
31. See Kemper, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., Homes & Son Constr. Co., Inc v. Bolo Corp., 526 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1974).
33. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Washington, 89 Wash. 2d 443, 453, 572 P.2d 8, 15 (1978) (recog-
nizing an award of prejudgment interest for the commission of an intentional tort or breach of con-
tract).
34. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1); see also Kemper, supra note 30.
35. Richard T. Apel, Comment, Interest as Damages in California, 5 UCLA L. REV. 262, 264
(1958). See also 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1) ("Both Jewish and Christian thinkers and moral-
ists of some periods thought it wrong to charge interest. The medieval Christian world called it evil
and prelates proscribed it."); CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 51 (1935); 1 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 289
(9th ed. 1912).
36. Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (Wis. 1899) (citing Adriance v. Brooks, 13 Tex. 279,
281 (1855)).
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on liquidated claims.37 At that time, "liquidated" meant that the amount
of the claim was absolutely certain and payable at a specific date.38
B. Historical Rationales for Awarding Interest
Courts have justified prejudgment interest on at least three different
theories: (1) punishment for the wrongful detention of money or prop-
erty; (2) full compensation of the claimant; and (3) disgorgement of prof-
its to prevent unjust enrichment. 39 In light of the various theories
relied on over the course of jurisprudence, courts continue to debate
whether interest should be awarded as a matter of right.40 Regardless,
courts continue to utilize multiple rationales for awarding interest.4'
1. Punishment for the Wrongful Detention of Money or Property
The theory that interest was awarded as punishment arose out of the
42common law dislike of interest as usury. With the increased importance
of personal property and commerce, courts began to enforce contracts
that awarded interest for non-payment.43 The motivating rationale for
allowing interest was a recognition that money was inherently valuable
to the user and, consequently, it was a legitimate subject of compensation
for the rightful owner.44 "This concession [of the law] was followed by a
recognition of the fact that a refusal to pay money legally due, like a re-
fusal to perform any other legal duty to another, merited condemnation
and punishment from the courts .. .. 5 As a result, interest was awarded
37. Prejudgment Interest as Damages: New Application of an Old Theory, 15 STAN. L. REV.
107, 107 (1962) [hereinafter Prejudgment Interest]. See also 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 35, § 299.
38. Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 107 n.6. See also 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 35,
§ 301.
39. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(3).
40. Compare Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)
(interest awards are based in equity and given in response to considerations of fairness), and La Paz
County v. Yuma County, 735 P.2d 772, 778 (Ariz. 1987) (interest runs as a matter of right), with
Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)
(interest does not run as a matter of right).
41. Compare Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of
prejudgment interest recognizes that the injured part was injured at the moment the cause of action
accrued, and that the injured party is entitled to be made whole as of that moment."), and La Paz
County, 735 P.2d at 778 (interest is generally awarded because the "party entitled to use of the
money has been deprived of that use, and the party retaining it has been unjustly enriched."), with
Espin v. Allergan Pharm., Inc., 317 A.2d 778, 779 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973) (allowing pre-
judgment interest encourages settlement and payment by defendant).
42. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1); Kemper, supra note 30; Prejudgment Interest, supra note
37, at 107-08 n.7.
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to the rightful owner (for example, the meritorious creditor-claimant) in
order to punish the debtor for the wrongful detention of money. 6
2. Full Compensation of Claimants for Lost Value
Following the punishment theory for awarding interest, full com-
pensation of a meritorious claimant became central to interest awards.47
Under this theory, prejudgment interest compensates the claimant for the
delay between the date of injury and the date of payment.48 Prejudgment
interest was used to provide an adjustment converting time-of-accident
damages into time-of-judgment damages, thereby achieving the goals of
full compensation. 49 As Chief Justice Cardozo explained in Prager v.
New Jersey Fidelity. & Plate Glass Insurance Co. of Newark,5° interest is
held to be an incident to just compensation.51 Interest, then, "is a con-
comitant very nearly automatic" for actions on contracts.52 By the early
nineteenth century, American courts awarded interest on tort claims as• •- 53
well as on contract theories of liability.
Central to this theory of interest as compensatory is a recognition of
the use value, or time value, of money 54-recognition that both property
46. Id. But see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-American Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1314, 1328
(E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding that awarding prejudgment interest did not penalize the defendants); Han-
sen v. Rothaus, 107 Wash. 2d 468, 475, 730 P.2d 662, 666 (1986) ("Prejudgment interest is not a
penalty imposed on a defendant for wrongdoing nor is its purpose to deter wrongdoing.").
47. See Laycock, 79 N.W. at 332. The court noted the following:
The idea of compensation to him who had been deprived of the use of his money may
have been present, but was never prominent, while the thought that the debtor by interest
was only paying for value in fact received by him from the use of the money of another is
hardly suggested, as in recent cases.
Id.
48. Jones v. Best, 134 Wash. 2d 232, 242, 950 P.2d 1, 6 (1998) (prejudgment interest compen-
sates a party for the loss of the use of money to which he was entitled). See also Carlton v. H.C.
Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1981).
49. Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 NW.
U. L. REV. 192, 192 (1982).
50. 156 N.E. 76 (N.Y. 1927).
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id.
53. Apel, supra note 35, at 264-65.
54. The U.S. Supreme Court noted the following about the time value of money:
It is essential to recognize the effect of time, either past or future, when determining the
value of any asset or liability. Thus, in economic transactions, an amount owed in the past
cannot be paid off today by paying the same nominal value that would have been owed
had it been paid in the past. Rather, the past nominal amount must be increased to a
higher present nominal amount in order to account for the earning power of the original
value during the time that has passed. Likewise, an amount owing in the future must be
discounted to a lower present value in order to account for the future earning power of the
value in question over the future period.
Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, 2000 WL 34508307, at *38 (U.S. 2000) (citation omitted).
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and money have the potential to produce more value. 55 Courts have rec-
ognized the mercantile privilege of money in the marketplace, stating
that the debtor "cannot be heard to say that it is fair and equitable that it
should enjoy such a financial advantage for so long, and not pay a cent
for it."'56 Further, because the "income-producing ability of money cannot
be separated from the money itself," a denial of interest would be a de-
nial of "an inexorable economic fact., 57 Today, many courts rest awards
of interest primarily, if not solely, on the theory of interest as necessary
to fully compensate a plaintiff for the losses sustained.58
Even if a debtor does not actually invest the money, obtain interest,
or profit otherwise from the money or property wrongfully withheld,
courts nevertheless award interest to claimants on liquidated amounts.59
The inquiry, then, is whether the claimant could have economically prof-
ited from the money to which she was entitled, not whether the debtor
did invest, use, or profit from the money. 60 Accordingly, interest may be
awarded regardless of whether or not the claimant actually realized any
61losses as a result of the delay in payment.
3. Disgorgement of Profits to Prevent Unjust Enrichment of the Debtor
In addition to the two aforementioned theories, interest awards may
be justified on the theories of disgorging profits and unjust enrichment.62
This justification rests upon two rationales. First, an "injurer allowed to
keep the return on this money [held and invested] has profited by the
wrong. 63 Second, like the compensatory rationale, such justification
rests upon the notion that a claimant has lost the use value of her
55. Id. See also Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1299
(11 th Cir. 2002) (time value of money generally calls for awarding prejudgment interest).
56. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 370 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Rothschild,
supra note 49, at 205:
57. Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 109.
58. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(3). See also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S.
648, 655-56 (1983) (prejudgment interest is necessary to put plaintiff in rightful position); Funk-
houser v. J.B. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163, 168 (1933) (finding that the injured party has suffered a
loss which may be regarded as not fully compensated "if he is confined to the amount found to be
recoverable as of the time of breach and nothing is added for the delay in obtaining the award of
damages.").
59. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1).
60. Wisper Corp. N.V. v. Cal. Commerce Bank, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
("An award of prejudgment interest is intended to make the plaintiff whole 'for the accrual of wealth
which could have been produced during the period of loss."') (emphasis added).
61. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1).
62. Id.
63. In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279,
1332 (7th Cir. 1992).
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money.64 To the extent that a debtor had the ability to freely use the
claimant's money-as opposed to actually making use of such money-
she has been unjustly enriched.65 "To divest defendant of this unjustified
benefit is not to penalize him, for it has been determined by the trial that
it was never rightfully his." 66 The claimant's loss, specifically the use
value of the claim, is identical to the unjust enrichment of the debtor,
specifically the income-producing ability of money or property.67
As an extension, awarding interest to the claimant also serves to
68remove any incentive a debtor has to delay payment. Absent an award
of interest, a debtor has an incentive to delay the payment of a debt in
order to recoup some value (that is, obtain profits from the use value of
money prior to its "return" to the claimant).69 An interest award to the
claimant removes that incentive because any value received will be
eclipsed by the interest award.7 ° In this manner, allowance of prejudg-
ment interest is a valuable judicial mechanism, inducing prompt consid-
eration of settlement possibilities by the debtor.7 1
C. Prejudgment Interest Awards: The Historical Distinction
Between Liquidated and Unliquidated Claims
The common law development of interest awards highlights the
historical distinction between liquidated and unliquidated claims. In
England, because ancient prejudices condemned interest payments as
64. La Paz County v. Yuma County, 735 P.2d 772, 778 (Ariz. 1987) (interest is generally
awarded because "the party entitled to use of the money has been deprived of that use, and the party
retaining it has been unjustly enriched.").
65. Id.; Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 109.
66. Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 109.
67. Rothschild, supra note 49, at 205.
68. 1 DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1). See also Espin v. Allergan Pharm., Inc., 317 A.2d 779,
780 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1973) (allowing prejudgment interest encourages settlement and payment
by defendant); State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 274 (Alaska 1970) (finding that a failure to "award
prejudgment interest creates a substantial financial incentive for defendants to litigate even where
liability is so clear and the jury award so predictable that they should settle.").
69. Caffey v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that defendants
would have a "strong incentive to delay payment of prejudgment interest as long as possible, since
they would be able to enjoy the benefit of continued use of the funds during any period of delay, and
would bear a lesser financial burden once payment was ultimately made.").
70. Id. This is especially true when the market interest rate is less than the statutorily pre-
scribed interest rate. In such a situation, the debtor may actually incur a net loss by delaying payment
because the interest return available in the market would be less than the interest the debtor would be
required to pay for that same period. Cf In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of Fr. on
Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1331 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Prejudgment interest at the market rate puts
both parties in the position they would have occupied had compensation been paid promptly.");
Knoll, supra note 1, at 297 ("With interest at a market rate, neither party would benefit from nor be
injured by delay" resulting from litigation).
71. Domangue v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1984).
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usury,72 "interest was generally allowed only in the discretion of the jury
rather than by way of well defined rules, and even then only in a limited
number of cases. ' 73 For example, interest was only permitted "as a mat-
ter of law: First, on commercial paper; Second, on contracts expressly
providing for it; Third, where an agreement to pay it is implied from us-
age, or the dealing of the parties. '' 74 In other cases, it was permitted in the
discretion of the jury only when provided for by statute or as special
75damages for the detention of money.
In contrast to English courts, American courts historically awarded
interest more liberally.76 In this country, courts allowed interest "at an
early date in the case of 'liquidated' claims, but [interest] was denied
when the amount due was considered 'unliquidated.' 77 Courts only
awarded interest where the sum due was certain and demandable at a
specific point in time.7 8 By definition, then, this rule confined interest
awards to strictly liquidated demands. 79 Accordingly, if a claim required
calculation or was not fixed at the time when it became due, an award of
interest was improper. 80 Any uncertainty respecting the plaintiffs claim
precluded the plaintiff from recovering prejudgment interest. 81
By the early nineteenth century, however, the prevailing rule in the
U.S. progressed beyond the limits of allowing interest only on strictly
liquidated claims. 82 "[I]f the amount of the plaintiffs claim, even though
not liquidated, could be determined by reference to well established mar-
ket values or by computation, he was given interest as a matter of law. 8 3
Accordingly, courts gradually extended interest as damages.84 "Begin-
ning with a denial of interest in any case except where it was allowed by
contract, the law first gave discretion to the jury to give interest as
72. KENNETH H. YORK & JOHN A. BAUMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 33 (2d ed.
1973).
73. Id.
74. 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 35, §291.
75. Id.
76. 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 35, §292.
77. YORK & BAUMAN, supra note 72.
78. Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 332-33 (Wis. 1899) ("Being punishment, [interest] would
not be imposed if there were any uncertainty as to the defendant's duty to excuse nonperformance of
it."). See also McMahon v. N.Y. & Erie. R.R. Co., 20 N.Y. 463, 468 (N.Y. 1859) (highlighting shift
from common law definite set standard to computation standard).
79. Laycock, 79 N.W. at 332.
80. See McMahon, 20 N.Y. at 469 (recognizing the old common law rule that required that a
demand be ascertained prior to awarding interest, and the expansion to include claims capable of
being ascertained by mere computation).
81. See Laycock, 79 N.W. at 332-33.
82. YORK & BAUMAN, supra note 72.
83. Id.
84. 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 35, §297.
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damages, and then allowed it as a matter of law in a constantly increasing
number of cases."
85
Courts primarily relied on two reasons for broadening the strict re-
quirement to allow claimants to recover interest on unliquidated claims
when the amount could be determined by reference to well-established
market values. First, given the importance of "certainty" in interest
awards, expansion of prejudgment interest awards to include a simple
calculation introduced very little uncertainty: only the "settling of market
rates and prices. 86 Second, because many market values are well-
established and easily obtained, a debtor may easily obtain proximate
knowledge of the amount owed.
87
Today, courts employ a similar, albeit somewhat broader, definition
of "liquidated., 88 The definition varies slightly by jurisdiction and is ei-
ther codified as state statutory law89 or has evolved through common
law.90 Generally, a claim is liquidated "if the evidence furnishes data
which, if believed, makes it possible to compute the amount with exact-
ness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion." 91 Conversely, "unliq-
uidated" refers to those claims that require some reliance on opinion,
discretion, or are not easily ascertainable by a debtor.92 The consequence
of this distinction, however, has not changed over time: interest is typi-
cally only allowed on liquidated claims.93
85. Id.
86. McMahon v. New York & Erie R. R. Co., 20 N.Y. 463, 469 (N.Y. 1859).
87. See Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 68-69 (Cal. 1881).
88. See Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'g Co., 74 Wash. 2d 25, 34, 442 P.2d 621, 627 (1968) (quot-
ing Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 334 (1899) ("It may be safely said that the tendency has been
in favor of allowing interest rather than against it, and that the degree of certainty or ease with which
the approximate amount can be ascertained his [sic] grown less and less stringent.")).
89. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287 (1997); see also 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, §66:109
(citing cases).
90. See In re Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 324 B.R. 829, 866 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005)
("[E]ntitlement to prejudgment interest is governed by case law, not statute."); Bailie Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Trend Bus. Sys., Inc., 61 Wash. App. 151, 161-62, 810 P.2d 12, 19 (1991) (while interest on
a judgment is allowed by statute, prejudgment interest is allowed by state law).
91. Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 170, 273 P.2d 652, 659 (1954)
(quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 54).
92. See id. at 175, 273 P.2d at 662 (a claim is not liquidated if it is "necessary to establish by
evidence the amount of services furnished, or the quantity of material supplied, and not being able to
establish these either by computation or by reference to a known standard') (citation omitted); Han-
sen v. Rothaus, 107 Wash. 2d 468, 473, 730 P.2d 662, 665 (1986) (an unliquidated claim is one
where the "exact amount of the sum to be allowed cannot be definitely fixed from the facts proved,
disputed or undisputed, but must in the last analysis depend upon the opinion or discretion of the
judge or jury as to whether a larger or smaller amount should be allowed." (quoting Prier, 74 Wash.
2d at 33, 442 P.2d at 626)).
93. Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 174, 273 P.2d at 661 (As a general rule, "interest is not
allowed upon unliquidated demands[, but courts] .... will not hesitate to make it yield to the equities
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Although a claimant is equally deprived of the use value of money
as between an unliquidated and a liquidated claim, in the case of an
unliquidated claim the law protects the debtor rather than simply com-
pensating the claimant. 94 With respect to an unliquidated claim, the diffi-
culty with forcing a debtor to pay prejudgment interest is that a debtor
ought not to pay money unless it can be ascertained how much she ought
to pay the claimant with reasonable exactness.95 If a debtor, then, does
not know what sum is owed, equitable principles suggest that the debtor
96cannot be in default for a failure to pay. This "protection theory" denies
prejudgment interest to a claimant and values a debtor's proximate
knowledge over fully compensating a claimant or punishing a debtor.97
Despite the well-recognized character of interest awards as primar-
ily compensatory in nature, the distinction between liquidated and unliq-
uidated claims is rooted in punishment-that a debtor should not be pun-
ished for failing to repay an unascertainable amount prior to judgment.
98
This is not to say, however, that interest is never compensatory; on the
contrary, theories of punishment and compensation underlie interest
awards as well.99 In light of the foregoing principles, some courts focus
solely on whether the debtor actually knew the amount owed or could
have computed that amount with reasonable certainty based on
information reasonably available to the debtor. 00 Where a debtor knew
of a given case.") (quoting Modem Irrigation & Land Co. v. Neely, 81 Wash. 38, 42, 142 P. 458,
459 (1914) (internal quotation omitted). Although prejudgment interest is generally unavailable in
breach of contract eases involving unliquidated claims, courts have ample discretion to include pre-
judgment interest in the damages award, if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff. 25
WILLISTON, supra note 24, §§ 66:109, 111 (citing D.C. Code § 15-109 (2001)). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354(2) (1981); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 466 (2005);
cf 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 45 (2005) (stating that exceptions exist to the general rule that unliq-
uidated claims do not bear interest).
94. See Apel, supra note 35, at 266.
95. Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 335 (Wis. 1899). See also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages
§ 466 (2005) (citing cases).
96. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 353 (1939) ("[N]o
claim of fairness calls upon her also to pay interest for the use of the money which she could not
have known was not properly hers.").
97. See La Paz County v. Yuma County, 735 P.2d 772, 780 (Ariz. 1987) (Feldman, V.C.J
dissenting). See also Rothschild, supra note 49, at 197.
98. Chesapeake Indus., Inc. v. Togova Enters., Inc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
99. Kemper, supra note 30 (allowance of prejudgment interest on liquidated claims ought not
to burden the debtor because the debtor knew the extent of the amount owed, while a denial thereof
would necessarily result in a loss to the claimant). See also Wisper Corp. N.V. v. California Com-
merce Bank, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (awarding interest based on compensa-
tion theory).
100. Chesapeake Indus., Inc., 197 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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or could have known the amount owed, an award of interest may be
proper. 1° 1
Of course, a difference of opinion as to an amount owed cannot
preclude the award of interest; 10 2 to do so would eliminate all interest
awards necessarily. 10 3 Accordingly, whether a claim is characterized as
liquidated or unliquidated turns not on the liability of the defendant, but
rather on the underlying cause of action. 10 4 In this manner, courts distin-
guish uncertainty regarding the amount of damages from uncertainty re-
garding liability.10 5 Disputes as to liability do not preclude interest
awards. 106
D. The Accrual of Prejudgment Interest Depends on
Whether the Claim Is Liquidated or Unliquidated
1. Liquidated Claims
Generally, interest awarded on a liquidated claim runs from the
time that the right to recover vested or accrued. 10 7 In a contract situation,
101. See, e.g., Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 111 F.3d 588, 592 (8th
Cir. 1997) (citing Fohn v. Title Ins. Corp., 529 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1975)).
102. Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 335 (Wis. 1899). See also Eastmount Constr. Co. v.
Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co., 301 F.2d 34, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1962) ("The fact that there is a dispute
between the parties as to materials furnished, work done, or extras does not necessarily have the
effect of rendering a demand unascertainable by calculation so as to require a disallowance of inter-
est.") (citing Lacy Mfg. Co. v. Gold Crown Mining Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 568, 579 (Cal. Ct. App.
1942)).
103. A claimant and a debtor necessarily have different opinions as to liability, damages, or
both-that is why they are at trial. Allowing this contest to preclude interest, then, would eliminate
all prejudgment interest awards at trial. See Beck v. Lawler, 422 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
The court stated the following:
The fact that the amount of plaintiff's recovery could not be ascertained until after a trial
of the cause does not affect this right to interest on the sum of $5,107.20 due on June 10,
1964, subject to any off-set, or counterclaim which the defendant might have established.
If this were not true then pre-judgment interest would not be recoverable in any case
where a counterclaim is filed and the amount sought to be recovered was placed in doubt
or reduced to an unliquidated claim.
Id.
104. Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'g Co., 74 Wash. 2d 25, 32-33, 442 P.2d 621, 626 (1968) (quot-
ing MCCORMICK, supra note 35, §54 (dispute over the whole or a part of the claim does not change
the character of that claim from liquidated to unliquidated); but see Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v.
Akzo Coatings, Inc., 896 P.2d 949, 955 (Idaho 1995) (where a "liquidated" claim and unliquidated
counterclaim are closely related, prejudgment interest can be precluded when the "liquidated" claim
is unascertainable because the unliquidated claim challenges the value thereof).
105. Fluor Corp., Ltd. v. United States ex rel. Mosher Steel Co., 405 F.2d 823, 829 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1969).
106. Homes & Son Constr. Co., Inc v. Bolo Corp., 526 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974);
Arizona Title Ins. & T. Co. v. O'Malley Lbr. Co., 484 P.2d 639, 649 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
107. 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 66:112.
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a claim accrues at the time of the breach'0 8 or at the time that payment or
performance was due.1°9 In situations in which no payment date was
specified, prejudgment interest runs from the claimant's first demand." 0
Similarly, in a tort action, prejudgment interest accrues at the commis-
sion of the tort, the first demand for the return of the money or property,
or the commencement of the lawsuit."' Typically, the commencement of
a lawsuit is the latest point in time from which prejudgment interest may




As noted above, unliquidated claims generally are not subject to
prejudgment interest awards. 1 3 But when interest on an unliquidated
claim is allowed, it may run from the date of demand or from the date the
action commenced because the suit is considered tantamount to a de-
mand.1 14 In many situations, however, prejudgment interest on unliqui-
dated claims is not allowed until commencement of the action unless the
debtor's obligation was "unilateral and performance was due at a fixed
time."115
III. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OFFSETS: CALCULATING
INTEREST ON A LIQUIDATED CLAIM WITH AN
OPPOSING UNLIQUIDATED COUNTERCLAIM
The existence of an unliquidated counterclaim does not change a
liquidated claim into an unliquidated claim. 1 16 For that reason, a plaintiff-
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354(1) (1981); 25 WILLISTON, supra note
24, § 66:112.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354(1) cmt. b (1981); 25 WILLISTON, supra
note 24, § 66:112. See also Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 172, 273 P.2d
652, 660 (1954).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354 cmt. b (1981) ("If the performance is to
be rendered on demand, interest does not begin to run until a demand is made, even though an action
might be maintained without a demand."); 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 66:112.
111. In re NETtel Corp., Inc. 327 B.R. 8, 12 n.5 (Bankr. D. Dist. Col. 2005); New Eng. Ins.
Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 333 F. Supp. 2d 87, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (in bad-faith
action, prejudgment interest accrued at the moment plaintiff first lost the use of money); Andre v.
Case Design, Inc., 797 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Ohio App. 2003) (injured party in tort action entitled to
prejudgment interest from the date that the cause of action accrues).
112. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 470 (2005). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 354 cmt. b (1981).
113. See, e.g., Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 174, 273 P.2d at 661.
114. 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 66:113 (internal citations omitted). However, most courts
are reluctant to award prejudgment interest on unliquidated claims. See discussion supra Part II.C.
115. 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, § 66:113.
116. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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claimant may receive prejudgment interest on a liquidated claim despite
the defendant-debtor's unliquidated counterclaim.'1 7 As a practical mat-
ter, however, an issue arises as to the amount of plaintiff-claimant's liq-
uidated demand that is entitled to an interest award vis-A-vis the
defendant-debtor's unliquidated counterclaim. This Comment focuses on
the situation where a liquidated claim is opposed by an unliquidated
counterclaim. 118 Faced with this situation, courts have taken one of two
primary approaches. 1 9 The first major approach, known as the interest
on the entire claim, or interest on the whole rule, awards interest on the
entire amount of the liquidated claim prior to the deduction of debtor's
unliquidated counterclaim. 120 The second major approach, known as the
interest on the balance rule, awards interest on the liquidated claim only
after deducting the unliquidated counterclaim.' 21 Algebraically, then:
Interest on the Whole Rule = (Plaintiffs Liquidated Damages *
Statutory Interest Rate) - Defendant/Counter-Claimant's Unliqui-
dated Damages
Interest on the Balance Rule = (Plaintiffs Liquidated Damages -
Defendant/Counter-Claimant's Unliquidated Damages) * Statutory
Interest Rate
Although it may seem that there is little difference between these
two rules, mathematically there may be a significant difference. The
slight change in the order of operations may result in two considerably
different damage awards. By way of illustration, Table 1 lists several
117. 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 50 (2005).
Ordinarily, where the amount of a demand is sufficiently certain to justify the allowance
of interest thereon, the existence of a setoff, counterclaim, or cross claim which is unliq-
uidated will not prevent the recovery of interest on the balance of the demand found due
from the time it became due, unless the plaintiff's liquidated claim is less than the award
to the defendant on his or her counterclaim.
Id.; I DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.6(1) ("When the defendant's counterclaim or set-off is successful
and reduces his liability for reasons arising out of the same facts that give rise to the plaintiffs
claim, the plaintiffs claim is still regarded as ascertainable and prejudgment interest still
awarded .... ); 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, §66:110 ("Interest will normally be awarded on a
liquidated claim even though it is subject to an unliquidated counterclaim or setoff.").
118. It is true that a plaintiff could assert an unliquidated claim and a defendant could cross-
complain with a liquidated claim. This situation, however, rests on exactly the same analysis argued
herein and has been eliminated for simplicity. See generally Burnett & Doty Dev. Co. v. Phillips,
148 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). Moreover, if both plaintiff and defendant assert liquidated
claims, and if each party is meritorious upon the respective claim, both plaintiff and defendant would
be entitled to prejudgment interest. Similarly, if both plaintiff and defendant asserted unliquidated
claims against each other, neither party would be entitled to prejudgment interest.
119. See supra note 16.
120. See supra notes 17, 18.
121. See supra notes 20-22.
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cases in which the amount of prejudgment interest varied significantly
depending on which rule the court used.
Table 1-Estimated Difference of Prejudgment Interest Awards
Between the Interest on the Whole Rule and the
Interest on the Balance Rule, in Dollars.122
Interest on the Interest on the Difference
Case Name Whole Rule Balance Rule Difference (adjusted 2007
(unadjusted) (unadjusted) (unadjusted) dollars) 123
Giant Food, Inc. v.
Jack S. Bender & $43,642.37125 $31,203.47126 $12,438.90 $34,680.89Sons 124
Indu Craft, Inc. v. 128 129
Bank of Baroda 12 7  $3,048,561.63 $2,264,698.62 $783,863.01 $1,041,118.21
Socony Mobile Oil 131 132
Co. v. Klapal 13 0  -$152,298.31 -$153,735.72 $1437.41 $9,634.26
Blasland, Bouck &
Lee, Inc. v. City of $556,234.72134 $389,488.71135 $166,746.01 $190,581.93
N.Miami
133
122. Note: this table is approximated based on the judgment and interest data provided in the
respective cases and may not be identical to the exact amount of prejudgment interest or principal
claims awarded by the respective court. Table 1 merely illustrates the difference that may exist in
prejudgment interest awards depending on which rule the court applied. Table I does not discuss the
decisions of the cases listed, nor does Table 1 reflect which rule the court ultimately applied or the
rationale for that award.
123. United States Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Data, Consumer Price Index
(CPI) Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
124. 399 A.2d 1293 (Ct. App. D.C. 1979).
125. = (liquidated principal)*(rate)*(time) + (liquidated principal) - (unliquidated counter-
claim) = {[($500)(.015)(60)] +[($40,139.92-4500)(.01)(60)] } + $40,139.92 - $20,731.50.
126. = (liquidated principal-unliquidated principal)*(rate)*(time) = ($500)(.015)(60) +
[($40,139.92-$20,731.50-$500)(.01 )(60)] + ($40,139.92-$20,731.50).
127. No. 87-cv-7379SHS, 1995 WL 479516 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995), affd, 87 F.3d 614 (2d
Cir. 1996).
128. = [($3,250,000)(.09)(5)] + $3,250,000 - $1,700,000.
129. = [($3,250,000 - $1,700,000)(.09)(5)] + ($3,250,000 - $1,700,000).
130. 205 F. Supp. 388 (D. Neb. 1962).
131. = [($8,384.11)(.06)(3)] + $8,384.11 - $162,119.83.
132. Plaintiff is not entitled to interest on the balance because there remains nothing upon
which to calculate interest. See Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554-55
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). Accordingly, net judgment is for the defendant, which is
$162,119.83 - $8,384.11.
133. 283 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2002).
134. See Brief of Appellant City of North Miami at 31, Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of
N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-14975-AA), 2001 WL 34091583.
135. = [($380,283.51 - $114,000)(.11)(4.206)] + ($380,283.51 - $114,000).
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Interest on the Interest on the Difference Difference
Case Name Whole Rule Balance Rule (adjusted 2007
(unadjusted) (unadjusted) (unadjusted) dollars) 123
Mall Tool Co. v. Far 137 138
West Equip. Co.136  $17,624.98 $15,696.43 $1,928.55 $14,511.87
Ralston Purina Co. v.
Parsons Feed & Farm $79,568.78 140 $72,803.04141 $6,765.74 $44,177.23
Supply, Inc. 
139
Jet Boats, Inc. v.
Puget Sound Nat'l $14,751 143 $4,297.20 144 $10,453.80 $19,306.72
Bank
142
This difference between the two formulas is compounded by the
statutory interest rate145 or the market interest rate. 146 For example,
Washington applies a twelve percent interest rate for prejudgment inter-
est awards. 147 As a result, many parties litigate the slight difference in the
order of operations between the interest on the whole rule and the interest
on the balance rule.
148
136.45 Wash. 2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
137. = [($23,730.94)(.06)(3.083)] + $23,730.94 - $10,475.05.
138. = [($23,730.94 - $10,475.05)(.06)(3.083)] + ($23,730.94 - $10,475.05).
139. 416 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1969).
140. = ($116,471.60)(.06)(2.1667) + $116,471.60 - $52,044.13.
141. = ($116,471.60 - $52,044.13)(.06)(2.1667) + ($116,471.60 - $52,044.13).
142.44 Wash. App. 32, 721 P.2d 18 (1986).
143. = $29,658 + $11,667 - $26,574.
144. = ($29,658 - $26,574)(.39338) + ($29,658 - $26,574), where 0.39338 is the interest rate
and time coefficient calculated from the trial court's award.
145. This interest rate varies by jurisdiction. For example, in Washington, "[e]very loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or thing in action shall bear interest at the rate of twelve percent per
annum where no different rate is agreed to in writing between the parties .... " WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.52.010(1) (2004). Moreover, any rate of interest "shall be legal so long as the rate of interest
does not exceed the higher of: (a) Twelve percent per annum; or (b) four percentage points above the
equivalent coupon issue yield ... of the average bill rate for twenty-six week treasury bills." WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.52.020(1) (2004).
146. Knoll, supra note 1, at 297; In re Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of
Fr. on Mar. 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992).
147. See supra note 157.
148. See supra note 134, Table 1.
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A. Prejudgment Interest Offsets in Washington:
The Interest on the Whole Rule
1. Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co.: The Foundation Case
For the last fifty years, Washington has utilized the interest on the
whole rule for calculating prejudgment interest. 49 In Mall Tool Co. v.
Far West Equipment Co., 50 the Washington Supreme Court established
that "only when the amount to which a defendant is entitled as a counter-
claim or setoff is for defective workmanship or other defective perform-
ance by the plaintiff' may a plaintiff receive interest on the balance of
the two claims.' 5' Mall Tool Co. represents the current state of
Washington law regarding prejudgment interest offsets. 152
In Mall Tool Co., the plaintiff-manufacturer brought an action on an
open account against the defendant-distributor for chain saws sold and
delivered to the defendant-distributor.' 53 The defendant-distributor cross-
complained for violation of the exclusive distributorship clause.' 54 At
trial, the defendant-distributor conceded that it owed the plaintiff-
manufacturer $23,730.94 for chain saws and other equipment previously
sold and delivered to the defendant-distributor. 55 The controversy cen-
tered on the amount the defendant-distributor was entitled to in offsets
and the amount due to plaintiff-manufacturer subject to interest. 56 Both
parties appealed the judgment of the trial court.'57
The contract at issue contained an exclusive distributor clause that
established a protected area for the defendant-distributor. 58 Pursuant to
that contract, the plaintiff-manufacturer could terminate the contract pro-
vided that the plaintiff-manufacturer gave at least a thirty-day notice to
the defendant-distributor. 59 The contract, however, did not expressly
provide a clause allowing modification.' 60 Both parties adhered to the
contract until the plaintiff-manufacturer unilaterally modified the
149. See generally Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 177, 273 P.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Gemini Farms LLC v. Smith-Kem Ellensburg, Inc., 104 Wash. App. 267, 269,
16 P.3d 82, 84 (2001) (using Mall Tool Co. to determine prejudgment interest).
153. Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 160-61, 273 P.2d at 654.
154. Id. at 160, 273 P.2d at 654.
155. Id. at 161, 273 P.2d at 654.
156. Id. at 160-61, 177, 273 P.2d at 654, 663.
157. Id. at 161, 273 P.2d at 654.
158. Id. at 162, 273 P.2d at 655.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 162-63, 273 P.2d at 655. Here, when plaintiff-manufacturer proposed a modifi-
cation, defendant-distributor had the opportunity to accept or reject the modification, knowing full
well that a refusal would mean a termination of the exclusive distributorship agreement.
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agreement without notice to the defendant-distributor, allowing a third-
party distributor to sell chain saws in the defendant-distributor's pro-
tected area.161 Subsequent to this modification, the plaintiff-manufacturer
also withdrew its commission and payments to the defendant-distributor
without notice. 162 On cross-appeals, the supreme court held that the
plaintiff-manufacturer breached its exclusivity distributorship agreement
with the defendant-distributor. 163 In addition to disputing the amount of
the defendant-distributor's cross-complaint, the plaintiff-manufacturer
asserted on appeal that it was entitled to prejudgment interest on the
entire amount for chain saws and equipment sold and delivered to the
defendant-distributor. 164 The court agreed. 
165
In calculating the prejudgment interest component of the plaintiffs
damage award, the court began with the premise that interest prior to
judgment was allowable only on liquidated claims. 166 The existence of
the defendant-distributor's unliquidated counterclaim did not preclude
awarding the plaintiff-manufacturer prejudgment interest "since the [de-
fendant-distributor] may not defeat the creditor's right to interest on such
a claim by setting up an unliquidated claim as a setoff.', 167 As a general
rule then, the court stated that the plaintiff-manufacturer may receive
interest on its whole claim prior to deducting the defendant-distributor's
counterclaim. 168 Importantly, the court recognized one narrow exception
to this rule:
There is a rule, however, applicable under certain circumstances,
that the amount found to be due on a liquidated or determinable
claim may be reduced by the amount found to be due on an unliqui-
dated counterclaim or setoff, and that interest will be allowable only
on the balance remaining after the reduction has been made. This
rule is applicable only when the amount to which a defendant is en-
titled as a counterclaim or setoff is for defective workmanship or
other defective performance by the plaintiff, of the contract on
161. Id. at 163, 273 P.2d at 655-56.
162. Id. at 163-64, 273 P.2d at 656.
163. Id. at 179, 273 P.2d at 664.
164. Id. at 169, 273 P.2d at 659. Plaintiff-manufacturer only sought interest from the date of
the last delivery of goods on the open account. Id. Defendant-distributor's cross-complaint for
breach previously vested, and accordingly, was actionable at the same time as plaintiff-
manufacturer's complaint. Id. at 169, 273 P.2d at 658-59. No reason for defendant-distributor's
delay in filing was provided. See generally id. at 160-179, P.2d at 654-64.
165. Id. at 179, 273 P.2d at 664.
166. Id. at 171-76, 273 P.2d at 660-62.
167. Id. at 177, 273 P.2d at 663 (stating that if the counterclaim or setoff be liquidated or be
determinable, such claim could bear interest in its own right from the time it or the various items that
comprise it become due and payable) (citing Hansen v. Covell, 24 P.2d 772, 776 (Cal. 1933)).
168. Id. at 179, 273 P.2d at 664.
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which his liquidated or determinable claim is based, of a character
such that the award of damages as compensation is regarded as con-
stituting either a reduction of the amount due the plaintiff or a pay-
ment to him.
169
The court reasoned that in those stated situations the plaintiff has been
deprived only of the use of the balance of the claims, not the plaintiffs
entire claim.1 70 By extension, since the plaintiff had a right to only the
balance thereof, the defendant should not have to pay interest on the
amount to which the plaintiff was never entitled.
171
Applying that rule to the parties before it, the court held that the
plaintiff-manufacturer was entitled to interest on the entire liquidated
claim despite the existence of the defendant-distributor's meritorious
cross-complaint.1 72 The court established the narrowness of the exception
to Washington's interest on the whole rule by stating that the plaintiff-
manufacturer's "breach of its exclusive distributorship contract with [the
defendant-distributor] involved a separate (bilateral) feature of the con-
tract and had nothing directly to do with the sale of goods, wares, and
merchandise to [the defendant-distributor] or the amount due there-
for.' ' 173 In this fashion, Mall Tool Co. utilized the "interest on the entire
claim" rule while noting a narrow "interest on the balance" exception to
that rule.
174
2. Post Mall Tool Co.: Contemporary Application of Interest
on the Whole Rule and Mall Tool Co.'s Narrow Exception
Since Mall Tool Co., Washington courts have continued to recog-
nize the narrow exception to the interest on the whole rule. 175 For exam-
ple, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. CX Processing Laboratories,
Inc., 176 the Ninth Circuit applied the logic from Mall Tool Co. to uphold
the unliquidated setoff of a liquidated claim.177 There, the court held that
unliquidated damages incurred as a result of the manufacturer's breach of
169. Id. at 177, 273 P.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Gemini Farms LLC v. Smith-Kem Ellensburg, Inc., 104 Wash. App. 267, 269, 16 P.3d 82,
84 (2001) ("And the amount the seller owes the buyer is not funds it is deprived of the rightful use
of.").
172. Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 178-79, 273 P.2d at 664.
173. Id. at 179, 273 P.2d at 664.
174. See id. at 177-79, 273 P.2d at 663-64.
175. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Labs., Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 679 (9th Cir.
1975) (reaffirming Mall Tool Co.'s unitary contract requirement as unchanged); Gemini Farms LLC,
104 Wash. App. at 269, 16 P.3d at 84; Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey Irrigation Supply, 89 Wash. App.
906, 919, 951 P.2d 338, 345-46 (1998) ("It is clear that the Mall Tool exception is a narrow one.").
176. 523 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975).
177. Id. at 680.
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a master purchase contract should be setoff against the manufacturer's
liquidated claim for payment for certain goods sold and delivered to the
buyer prior to the calculation of prejudgment interest.178 In contrast to
the "bilateral" nature of the contract in Mall Tool Co., the court stated
that the contract was, in fact, a "unitary contract."'1 79 Underlying this dis-
tinction was the court's recognition that the master purchase contract
expressly stipulated that such goods were to be delivered in four separate
shipments. 180 Failure to meet this contract directly resulted in the buyer's
damages. 181 In this sense, both claims arose from the "same contract pro-
vision,"' 82 which created the necessary unitary contract mandated by the
Washington Supreme Court in Mall Tool Co.183 Applying Mall Tool
Co.'s narrow exception to the interest on the entire claim rule, the Ninth
Circuit awarded interest only on the balance of the meritorious claims.
18 4
In light of the aforementioned cases, although an unliquidated
counterclaim must be "related to the plaintiff's claim,"18 5 the Washington
rule, in practice, is much narrower than simply requiring a connection
between the opposing claims.1 86 On the contrary, Washington courts re-
quire the existence of a unitary contract and damages proximately result-
ing from the same provision.1 87 Moreover, central to the Mall Tool Co.
exception is the requirement that "[o]nly the value of defective product[s]
178. Id.
179. Id. See also Gemini Farms LLC, 104 Wash. App. at 270, 16 P.3d at 84 ("The question is
whether the counterclaims arose out of the same unitary contract.").
180. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Labs., Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 680 (9th Cir.
1975); but see Gemini Farms LLC, 104 Wash. App. at 270, 16 P.3d at 84 ("The fact that serial deliv-
eries are separately invoiced is not dispositive" as the parties did not contract for each delivery.).
181. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 523 F.2d at 680.
182. As applied in Westinghouse Elec. Corp., as long as plaintiff's claim and defendant's coun-
terclaim arise "from the same contract provision," Mall Tool Co.'s unitary contract requirement is
met. Id. The term unitary is used in contrast to "separate," or "bilateral." Id. at 679-80. See also
Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 178-79, 273 P.2d 652, 664 (1954).
183. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 523 F.2d at 680.
184. See id.
185. Jet Boats, Inc. v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 44 Wash. App. 32, 41,721 P.2d 18, 24 (1986);
Mitchell Int'l Enters., Inc. v. Daly, 33 Wash. App. 562, 567-68, 656 P.2d 1113, 1117 (1983) (focus-
ing on defective workmanship and substantially late performance as within Mall Tool Co.'s narrow
exception).
186. Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey Irrigation Supply, 89 Wash. App. 906, 919, 951 P.2d 338, 345
(1998) ("[T]he Mall Tool exception is a narrow one, [and deducting] unliquidated offsets from a
liquidated claim prior to calculating prejudgment interest is normally improper.").
187. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 523 F.2d at 680. Cf Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip. Co.,
45 Wash. 2d 158, 179, 273 P.2d 652, 664 (1954) (stating "breach of its exclusive distributorship
contract with [defendant-distributor] involved a separate (bilateral) feature of the contract and had
nothing directly to do with the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise to [defendant-distributor] or
the amount due therefore.").
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may be deducted from a liquidated amount." 188 In all other situations, the
counterclaim must be a credit toward plaintiffs judgment award, to be
applied subsequent to calculating prejudgment interest rather than a
deduction to be made in arriving at the judgment. 189 Today, Washington
courts uniformly recognize the interest on the whole rule.190
B. Prejudgment Interest Offsets in California:
The Interest on the Balance Rule
1. The Origin: Hansen v. Covell
California, like Washington, recognizes the historical difference be-
tween liquidated and unliquidated claims. 191 Contrary to Washington,
however, California courts generally apply the interest on the balance
rule.
192
The seminal case in California is Hansen v. Covell, 193 which estab-
lished the interest on the balance rule.1 94 In Hansen, the plaintiff-
contractors brought an action to recover unpaid balances due under a
contract in addition to certain other items and damages.1 95 The construc-
tion contract at issue stipulated that certain progress payments were due
from the defendant-owner over the course of the project. 196 The plaintiff-
contractors commenced an action to recover the final two payments in
addition to certain charges for damages and delays allegedly caused by
188. Buckner, Inc., 89 Wash. App. at 920, 951 P.2d at 346.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Gemini Farms LLC v. Smith-Kem Ellensburg, Inc., 104 Wash. App. 267, 269,
16 P.3d 82, 84 (2001) (applying the Mall Tool exception to a contract for defective farm chemicals
and negligence, the same goods giving rise to plaintiff's claim as defendant's claim); Buckner, Inc.,
89 Wash. App. at 917, 951 P.2d at 344 ("Deducting unliquidated offsets from a liquidated claim
prior to calculating prejudgment interest is normally improper."); Mitchell Int'l Enters., Inc. v. Daly,
33 Wash. App. 562, 567, 656 P.2d 1113, 1117 (1983) ("Generally, an unliquidated counterclaim
cannot affect the opposing party's right to interest on the full amount of its liquidated claim.").
191. See, e.g., Cox v. McLaughlin, 76 Cal. 60, 68 (Cal. 1881).
192. This is not to say that California courts do not award interest on plaintiff's entire claim;
rather, the interest on the whole rule is applicable only in those situations where the defendant-
debtor's claim for deduction was not demandable when plaintiff-claimant's original liquidated claim
became due. 23 CAL. JUR. 3D Damages § 102 (2005). In that situation, defendant-debtor's claim is
instead properly asserted as a cross-claim for damages, not a prejudgment discount/payment. Id. See
also Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1969)
(interest on the entire claim rule is an exception to the interest on the balance rule); Socony Mobil
Oil Co. v. Klapal, 205 F. Supp. 388, 391 (D. Neb. 1962) (interest on the balance rule is applied as
the general rule).
193. 24 P.2d 772 (Cal. 1933).
194. Id. at 775-76.
195. Id. at 773.
196. Id. at 774.
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the defendant-owner. 197 The defendant-property owner filed a cross-
complaint, alleging that the plaintiff-contractors abandoned the construc-
tion of a hotel building which resulted in damages from the cost of
completion. 198 Several contractors also filed mechanics liens and, accord-
ingly, were made parties to the litigation.'
99
After a protracted trial on numerous issues, the trial court awarded
the plaintiff-contractors the two final payments plus certain other dam-
ages.200 In addition, the trial court held that the defendant-owner was en-
titled to an offset for amounts paid by the defendant-owner to satisfy the
subcontractors' liens and the plaintiff-contractor's defective workman-
ship. 20 1 Despite this "offset," the trial court awarded the plaintiff interest
on the plaintiffs entire claim from the time it became due.202 As a result,
both parties appealed.20 3
On appeal, the California Supreme Court modified the trial court's
judgment in certain respects, rejecting the defendant's "contention, inter
alia, that interest was incorrectly awarded to the plaintiffs. 20 4 In so do-
ing, the court rejected the defendant's argument that whenever a contrac-
tually-owed liquidated sum is subject to deduction by reason of an
unliquidated offset, the balance due is not a sum capable of being made
certain by calculation.20 5 Underlying the court's reasoning was the con-
cept that a debtor may not defeat a creditor's right to prejudgment
interest on a liquidated sum simply by setting up an unliquidated claim as
an offset.20 6
The court, however, also rejected the plaintiffs contention that the
court should award interest on the plaintiffs entire claim.20 7 "Where the
amount of a claim under a contract is certain and liquidated, or is ascer-
tainable but is reduced by reason of the existence of an unliquidated set-
off or counterclaim thereto, interest is properly allowed on the balance
found to be due from the time it became due. ' 0 8 In so doing, the court
rejected the plaintiffs contention that by awarding interest on the
197. Id.
198. Id. at 773.
199. Id. at 774.
200. Id. at 774-75; see also Kemper, supra note 30.
201. Hansen, 24 P.2d at 774. See also Kemper, supra note 30.
202. Hansen, 24 P.2d at 774.
203. Id.
204. Kemper, supra note 30.
205. Hansen, 24 P.2d at 775.
206. Id. at 775-76.
207. See id
208. Id. at 776 (quoting 3 A.L.R. 809 (1919)).
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balance, as opposed to interest on the entire claim, the court is effectively
awarding interest on the unliquidated claim.
209
Applying the interest on the balance rule, the court expressly dis-
tinguished the interest on the entire claim rule as utilized by the trial
court.2 0 The interest on the entire claim rule, the court expressed, is only
"applicable in cases where the claim for deduction could not be said to
be demandable at the time when the original liquidated claim became
due, but was rather the proper subject of a counterclaim for damages than
of an offset in the nature of a payment."
21'
2. Modem Application of Hansen v. Covell
Since the decision in Hansen v. Covell, California courts have wres-
tled with the application of the interest on the balance rule. For example,
in Burgermeister Brewing Corp. v. Bowman,212  the plaintiff-
manufacturer commenced an action to recover monies owed for beer sold
and delivered to the defendant-distributor. 21 3 The defendant-distributor
admitted the debt, but cross-complained for certain damages allegedly
caused by the plaintiff-manufacturer's repudiation of an oral exclusive-
distributor contract.214 The first trial resulted in a jury verdict for the
defendant-distributor; 21 5 however, this decision was reversed and re-
manded.21 6 On retrial, the defendant-distributor again received a favor-
able verdict on his breach of exclusive-distributor contract.1 7 Calculating
the final damage award, the trial court awarded the plaintiff-
manufacturer interest on the liquidated claim for beer sold and
delivered.1 8 Subsequently, that amount was offset by the defendant-
distributor's jury award on the unliquidated claim. 21 9 In light of the trial
court's judgment, both parties appealed: the plaintiff-manufacturer as to
the cross-complaint and the defendant-distributor as to the court's award
209. Id. at 777.
210. Id. at 776.
211. Id. See also 23 CAL. JUR. 3D DAMAGES § 102 (2005) ("[T]his principle appears to be
applicable only in those cases where the defendant's claim for deduction was not demandable when
the plaintiffs original liquidated claim became due") (emphasis added); Shore v. Crail Jr., 123 P.2d
840, 843 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (interest on the balance properly denied where defendant's claim may
have been acquired subsequent to plaintiffs claim).
212. 38 Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
213. Id. at 598-99.
214. Id. at 599.
215. Id. Because defendant stipulated to liability on the open beer account, the trial consisted
solely of defendant's cross-complaint. See id.
216. Id. The first verdict was reversed and remanded for an error in instructions. Id.
217. Id. Interestingly, the award on defendant's claim was nearly $10,000 more on retrial than
awarded in the first trial. See id. at 599 n. 1 ($36,040 in first trial as compared to $46,000 on retrial).
218. Id. at 603-04.
219. Id. at 604.
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of prejudgment interest to the plaintiff-manufacturer on the open
account.22°
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the trial court
erred in calculating the award of prejudgment interest.22 1 Noting Han-
sen's holding that "'defective workmanship' or 'defective performance'
of the contract is the distinctive factor in the curtailment (or denial) of
interest," the Burgermiester court, nevertheless, established that there is
no distinction between defective performance and no performance. 2
Consequently, the court broadened the reach of the interest on the bal-
ance rule, stating that if a plaintiff renders defective performance and is
not entitled to prejudgment interest, then there is "no sound reason not to
apply the same rule when the breach consists of a refusal (by wrongful
termination) to perform the plaintiffs obligations under the contract at
all."2 23
Moreover, the court established that the fact that the defendant's
unliquidated counterclaim exceeded the plaintiffs liquidated claim is of
no moment; the simple fact that the plaintiff would then receive no pre-
judgment interest on the balance does not affect the determination of
whether the defendant is entitled to an offset.224 The court noted, "[a]s we
see it, if, when the day of reckoning is reached, it has been decided that a
defendant is entitled to an offset, this is a finding that the plaintiff was
never entitled to more than the net amount."225 The court emphatically
supported this offset prior to calculating prejudgment interest, stating
"[p]alpable inequity attends the assertion of the contrary rule [that is, the
interest on the entire claim] .,,226 The defendant-distributor "was therefore
justified in withholding payment" on the open account even though his
claim had not yet been judicially determined. 7
When an unliquidated claim exceeds a liquidated claim, California
courts award the unliquidated demand offset by only the liquidated
claim: no interest is calculated on either claim. 228 For example, in Burnett
& Doty Dev. Co. v. Phillips,229 the plaintiff-contractor sued the defen-
220. Id. at 599.
221. Id. at 604.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. See also Burnett & Doty Dev. Co. v. Phillips, 148 Cal. Rptr. 569, 573 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (since the amount of the unliquidated counterclaim exceeds the value of plaintiff's liquidated
claim, there remains nothing on which to calculate or allow interest).
225. Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Burnett & Doty Dev. Co. v. Phillips, 148 Cal. Rptr. 569, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
229. 148 Cal. Rptr. 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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dant-subcontractor for damages incurred after the defendant-
subcontractor allegedly failed to complete performance on a housing de-
velopment that the plaintiff-contractor was helping construct.230  In
response, the defendant-subcontractor cross-complained for balances due
on the contract. 23' After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiff
$33,707 on the plaintiff-contractor's.unliquidated claim,2 32 an amount
that was subsequently reduced by $22,365 due to the defendant-
subcontractor's liquidated set-off on the cross-complaint. 233 No interest
was awarded on either claim.
234
On cross-appeals, the court affirmed the trial court's verdict and
damage award.235 Relying upon Burgermeister, the court held that the
defendant-subcontractor's liquidated claim for balance due under con-
tract was reduced by the unliquidated offset, the damages resulting from
the defendant-subcontractor's breach of contract. 6 Because the unliqui-
dated damages exceeded the liquidated damages, nothing remained upon
which to calculate interest for the defendant-subcontractor. 7 Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff-contractor received the difference between its unliqui-
dated claim (without interest) and the defendant-subcontractor's
liquidated claim. 8
The common law interest of the balance rule, espoused in Hansen
v. Covell, is now codified in California law where an unliquidated coun-
terclaim constitutes a payment of a liquidated claim. 239 Applying Cali-
fornia Civil Code § 3287 in Arizona, a common law prejudgment interest




234. See id. at 570-71, 573.
235. Id. at 570.
236. Id. at 573.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Fluor Corp. v. United States ex rel. Mosher Steel Co., 405 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1969);
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287 (1997). The code provides the following:
(a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made
certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular
day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such
time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the
debt. This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any such
debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal
corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.
(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment to receive damages based upon a
cause of action in contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also recover interest
thereon from a date prior to the entry ofjudgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix,
but in no event earlier than the date the action was filed.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287 (1997).
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jurisdiction, 240 the Ninth Circuit held that "[i]f the unliquidated set-off or
counterclaim is based upon a breach unrelated to the sum due under the
primary claim, interest is allowed on the entire claim., 241 On the other
hand, if the "unliquidated set-off or counterclaim constitutes a partial
payment of the primary claim, interest is allowable on the balance due
after deducting the amount of the set-off or counterclaim as determined
at trial. 242 The court treated the California statute and the common law
interest on the balance rule identically.
243
3. Distinguishing Between a Payment and a Discount in California
California courts continue to distinguish between those claims that
constitute a "payment" and those claims that are merely "discounts., 244 If
an unliquidated counterclaim is considered a payment, then it is setoff
against plaintiff's claim prior to the calculation of interest. 45 Conversely,
if the claim is considered a discount, it is setoff against plaintiff's claim
after the calculation of interest.
246
The distinction between "payments" and "discounts" is predicated
on the relationship between the opposing claims and, more importantly,
the time at which the unliquidated claim became demandable vis-a-vis
the liquidated claim.247 Where defendant's unliquidated counterclaim
accrues after the point in time at which plaintiffs claim became demand-
able or if the unliquidated claim is unrelated to plaintiffs claim, the
unliquidated claim will be treated as a discount, not as a payment.
248
Moreover, California courts are careful to distinguish between
characterizing defendant's unliquidated claim as a discount and as a
payment.249 This distinction is important in two respects. First, because
240. Fluor Corp., 405 F.2d at 829.
241. Id. at 830.
242. Id.
243. Compare id. at 829-30, with Hansen v. Covell, 24 P.2d 772, 776-77 (Cal. 1933).
244. See, e.g., Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1957).
245. Russell v. Rogers, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 24, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. 1817) ("The plain-
tiff, as I before observed, was entitled to interest on his demand, and the discount set up by the de-
fendant was regarded as a discount, and not as a payment; an independent unliquidated demand
which did not carry interest.").
246. See, e.g., Hunt Foods, Inc., 248 F.2d at 27.
247. Id. (plaintiff receives interest on her full claim when defendant's unliquidated demand is
treated as a discount and not a payment "where the claim for deduction could not be said to be de-
mandable at the time when the original liquidated claim became due, but was rather the proper sub-
ject of a counter claim for damages than of an offset in the nature of a payment").
248. See id; California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785, 793 (Cal.
1955).
249. See California Lettuce Growers, Inc., 289 P.2d at 793; Muller v. Bares, 294 P.2d 505,
507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
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the claim is not treated as a payment, the unliquidated claim does not
affect the character or nature of plaintiffs claim as liquidated. ° The
existing unliquidated claim does not, then, render plaintiffs claim unde-
terminable prior to the fact finder's determination of liability and dam-
ages.25' Consequently, the plaintiffs claim is properly subject to an
interest award.252
Second, even though California courts characterize a defendant's
unliquidated claim as a discount, the courts consistently only award
plaintiff-claimants interest on the balance.253 The deduction of the unliq-
uidated claim from the liquidated claim occurs prior to the calculation of
interest so long as both claims arise out of the same contract or defective
performance thereof.
254
4. California Today: The Current Doctrine and Rationale
Under current California law, prejudgment interest is allowed only
on the balance due after offsets, not the gross amount due prior to offset
calculation.255 "In choosing between these rules [the] court is guided by
its rationale for awarding prejudgment interest: to compensate plaintiffs
for the loss of use of their investment capital. 2 56 Thus, where the plain-
tiff had use of the funds for the duration of the litigation, the interest on
the balance rule more closely approximates the realities of the setoff.
257
But where defendant paid partial settlements within months of trial, the
interest on the entire claim rule would more closely approximate the
setoffs.258
250. See California Lettuce Growers, Inc., 289 P.2d at 793; Muller, 294 P.2d at 507.
251. See Hunt Foods, Inc., 248 F.2d at 27.
252. See California Lettuce Growers, Inc., 289 P.2d at 793; Muller, 294 P.2d at 507.
253. See California Lettuce Growers, Inc., 289 P.2d at 793; Muller, 294 P.2d at 507.
254. See Muller, 294 P.2d at 506-07 (awarding interest on the balance when plaintiff's claim
was for breach of contract for the sale of fourteen horses and defendant-debtor asserted unliquidated
counterclaim alleging fraud and misrepresentation); Union Sugar Co. v. Hollister Estate Co., 47 P.2d
273, 280-81 (Cal. 1935) (unliquidated contract breach for defective growing of a crop).
255. Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying state
law in diversity action). See also Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 851 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The
'interest on the balance due rule' properly applies to recovery upon the state based claims.").
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IV. INTEREST ON THE BALANCE: THE BETTER REASONED APPROACH
FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OFFSETS WHEN BOTH CLAIMS ARISE
FROM THE SAME TRANSACTION, CONTRACT, OR OPERATIVE FACTS
Washington should adopt the interest on the balance rule when both
claims arise out of the same transaction, contract, or operative facts. This
rule is articulated by numerous treatises 25 9 and followed in many
states,26°  like California, when both claims arise from the same transac-
tion, contract, or operative facts.
The simple premise underlying the interest on the balance rule is
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a liquidated amount as of a certain
time, but as of that same time, the plaintiff owed the defendant for its
own breach.261 Thus, the plaintiff was only deprived of the use of the dif-
ference between the two claims.262 As a result, awarding prejudgment
interest on plaintiffs entire claim effectively confers a windfall to the
plaintiff-a windfall to which the plaintiff is not entitled.263 Accordingly,
Washington should replace Mall Tool Co.'s interest on the whole rule
and its narrow exception with the more equitable and logical interest on
the balance rule-awarding interest on the difference between the liqui-
dated and the unliquidated claims when both claims arise from the same
transaction, contract, or operative facts.
A. The Interest on the Balance Rule Adequately
Compensates Plaintiffs and Protects the Right to
Prejudgment Interest on Liquidated Claims
Concededly, a legitimate concern is raised with allowing unliqui-
dated claims to offset legitimate liquidated claims: "[c]ertainly a debtor
cannot defeat the running of interest against him for a part of a debt
which he admits that he owes, and which would otherwise draw interest,
259. See supra note 24.
260. See supra note 25.
261. Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 212-13 (8th Cir.
1969) (Throughout the contested period plaintiff was obligated to defendant and was deprived only
of the value of the difference between the two claims.).
262. 25 WILLISTON, supra note 24, §66:110.
263. See Interstate Brands Corp. v. Lily Transp. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D. Mass. 2003)
("The common law was particularly sensitive to the possibility that a liberal award of prejudgment
interest could result in a windfall for plaintiffs amounting, in essence, to an award of punitive dam-
ages."); Sterilite Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Mass. 1986) (holding that where
a party is not deprived of the use of its money, no interest is due upon such sums. Any other rule
would result in a windfall to that party).
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by simply making a claim of an unliquidated set-off against the whole
debt., 264 To be sure, the sole fact that the defendant has some claim
against that plaintiff should not necessarily entitle the defendant to offset
the plaintiff's interest on the liquidated claim. Allowing a debtor to assert
an unliquidated counterclaim that precludes a claimant from recovering
prejudgment interest would encourage debtors to plead unnecessary and
frivolous counterclaims.
This concern, however, is addressed by the interest on the balance
approach. First, merely allowing an unliquidated counterclaim does not
preclude all prejudgment interest on the plaintiffs claim-the plaintiff
may still receive interest on the liquidated claim. 265 Second, only legiti-
mate, meritorious claims arising from the same transaction, contract, or
operative facts preclude the plaintiff from recovering interest on the en-
tire claim.
Accordingly, if the unliquidated counterclaim is based upon a
breach unrelated or collateral to the sum due under the primary claim,
interest should be calculated on the plaintiffs entire claim.266 The defen-
dant's counterclaim, if meritorious, should be deducted after such calcu-
lation.267 If, on the other hand, the unliquidated counterclaim constitutes
a payment against the liquidated claim or arises from the same operative
facts or contract, interest should be allowable on the balance due after
deducting the amount of the defendant's unliquidated counterclaim as
determined at trial.268 Consequently, the interest on the balance rule pro-
tects the plaintiffs right to prejudgment interest, but only as to the
amount that the plaintiff was actually deprived of the use of that money
or property.
264. Harmon Cable Commc'ns of Nebraska LP v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468 N.W.2d
350, 371 (Neb. 1991). See also York Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Groussman Inv. Co., 443 P.2d 986,
987 (Colo. 1968) ("'Debtors cannot avoid the payment of interest by disputing the account ..
(quoting Florence & Cripple Creek R. Co. v. Tennant, 75 P. 410, 411 (Colo. 1904))).
265. Unless plaintiff's entire claim is subsumed by defendant's claim. In such a case there
remains nothing upon which to calculate prejudgment interest. See Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow
Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
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B. Because Mall Tool Co. 's Rationale Is Identical to the
Rationale Employed by Interest on the Balance Jurisdictions,
Washington's Unitary Contract Requirement Is Too Narrow
As noted above, Mall Tool Co. 2 69 established Washington's use of
the interest on the balance rule as an exception; its application is narrow
"on the theory that the plaintiff is entitled to interest only in the amount
of which it has been deprived of the use during the period of default.
270
Nevertheless, the court in Mall Tool Co. found that an exclusive distribu-
torship clause was a separate bilateral feature distinct from the price
terms for chain saws. 27' The rationale that Mall Tool Co. fundamentally
relied upon, the right to the use value of money, is exactly the same ra-
tionale on which jurisdictions following the interest on the balance rule
rely.27 2 Other courts considering distributorship contracts, 273 or liquidated
and unliquidated claims arising from the same transaction,274 have
awarded prejudgment interest for the very same reason: prejudgment in-
terest awards compensate a claimant for the lost use value of money or
property.
Neither Mall Tool Co. nor the subsequent cases have offered any
valid reason why the plaintiff is only deprived of money on a unitary
269. Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 177, 273 P.2d 652, 663 (Wash.
1954).
270. Id. In fact, prejudgment interest is awarded in Washington only to compensate a claimant
for lost use value of money (that is, full compensation), not to act as a punishment for wrongdoing.
Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wash. 2d 468, 474-75, 730 P.2d 662, 666 (1986); Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey
Irrigation Supply, 89 Wash. App. 906, 916-17, 951 P.2d 338, 344 (1998). See also Cavnar v. Qual-
ity Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1985) (finding that the purpose of prejudgment
interest is full compensation, not punishment of defendant's misbehavior).
271. Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 179, 273 P.2d at 664.
272. Compare id at 177, 273 P.2d at 663, with Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm
Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1969) (throughout the contested period the plaintiff was
obligated to the defendant and was deprived only of the value of the difference between the two
claims), and Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1300 (11 th Cir.
2002) ("[T]he purpose of prejudgment interest is to provide the prevailing party with the time value
of money it should have had at the time it was wronged-to restore the party to an unwronged
position ....").
273. See, e.g., Infra-Pak (Dallas), Inc. v. Carlson Stapler & Shippers Supply, Inc., 803 F.2d
862, 866 (5th Cir. 1986); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Klapal, 205 F. Supp. 388, 393 (Neb. 1962).
274. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp. v. Alpha Constr. Co., 455 P.2d 555, 560-61
(Kan. 1969). The court stated the following:
When a plaintiff sues for a liquidated sum and the defendant establishes an offsetting
claim based upon defective workmanship or defective performance of the same contract
by the plaintiff, the amount of the former is to be offset against the latter as of the due
date of the original debt and only the balance bears interest.
Id. (quoting Burgermeister Brewing Corp. v. Bowman, 227 Cal. App. 2d 274, 285 (1964)); Harmon
Cable Commc'ns of Nebraska LP v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 350, 371 (Neb.
1991) ("same general transaction"); Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554-
55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960); Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981).
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contract as opposed to a bilateral contract. 275 Indeed, in the case of Mall
Tool Co., both terms were essential. 7 6 If both parties agree to include
material terms, albeit on separate pages or sections of a multi-page con-
tract, why should one be distinct from the other? Establishing such a dis-
tinction by requiring the terms at issue to be part of the same provision 27
effectively means that a plaintiff rightfully detained payment to the de-
fendant for the plaintiffs breach and that the defendant, to obtain any
unliquidated damages, must go to court. During that trial, the plaintiff
may use any money wrongfully detained. In contrast, the defendant in-
curs the full cost of trial to obtain "full compensation" through litigation.
The defendant is not afforded the same luxury to use the wrongfully de-
tained money like the plaintiff because the defendant must compensate
the plaintiff in the form of prejudgment interest. Where both parties
damage each other at the same time, each injured party is due the dam-
ages as of that point in time because both claims are demandable at that
point in time. 278 To award the plaintiff interest calculated prior to the de-
fendant's offset effectively means the plaintiff rightfully detained money
from the defendant through the pendency of trial, while the defendant
wrongfully withheld money from the plaintiff over the exact same period
of time.
C. The Interest on the Whole Rule Confers a Windfall to the Plaintiff
Making the Plaintiff More than Whole, to the Defendant's Detriment
Awarding prejudgment interest on the entire claim confers a wind-
fall upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff should only be equitably entitled to
279prejudgment interest on the net wrong suffered, not the gross wrong.
"It simply would not make good sense to charge [unliquidated claimants]
interest on money they do not owe. 28 °
It is well established that prejudgment interest is awarded to fully
compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use value of money from the
275. The rationale for the narrow exception in Mall Tool Co. is that the balance is the only
amount plaintiff was deprived of. See Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 177,
273 P.2d 652, 663 (1954). There is nothing in such a rationale to confine this logic so narrowly.
276. See generally id. at 158, 273 P.2d at 652.
277. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Labs. Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 680 (9th Cir.
1975).
278. This is the logical extension of the compensation theory of awarding prejudgment interest.
See discussion supra Part ll.B.2. Such a theory does not depend on whether or not the injured party
is in fact plaintiff or defendant, but rather whether the party asserts a liquidated claim. See discussion
supra Part II.C.
279. See Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1299-1300
(1 th Cir. 2002); Coleman Eng'g Co., Inc. v. N. Am. Aviation, Inc., 420 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1966)
("Interest is not intended to be a windfall.").
280. Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981).
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date interest accrued throughout the pendency of trial.281 Assuming a
meritorious plaintiff should be returned to her unwronged state,282 the
award of prejudgment interest, then, functions as a means to make a
party whole for the wrongful detention of money or property, and the use
value thereof.
283
The amount of money, however, that would restore a plaintiff to
this unwronged position is the value of the plaintiffs damages minus the
defendant's damages.284 Assuming both the plaintiffs and the defen-
dant's claims are meritorious, each party has suffered some injury and is
owed some value of damages. The debt of both parties, although deter-
mined through trial, accrued at the time of breach or injury. At that point,
plaintiff is in no better position than the defendant to claim the lost use
value of money wrongfully detained. Yet, simply because of the type of
claim that a party asserted, the plaintiff is restored to a pre-injury posi-
tion and the defendant is not.
Although "full compensation" is typically applied to plaintiff-
claimants, when a defendant suffers injuries at the hands of a plaintiff,
the defendant is also entitled to full compensation. During the period that
the defendant owed the plaintiff damages the plaintiff also owed the de-
fendant the amount of the defendant's counterclaim. Between the accrual
of both the plaintiffs and the defendant's claims and the entry of judg-
ment, each party is deprived of the use of money only to the extent of the
difference between the two claims.2 85 Throughout this period, the plain-
tiff is obligated to the defendant for the amount of the defendant's dam-
ages and thus, the plaintiff was not deprived of the use of this money.286
As the money was never rightfully the plaintiffs, it is irrelevant that the
defendant needed a trial to determine the extent of its damages. In this
manner, the verdict merely functions as an ex post facto determination of
281. See discussion supra Part 1I.B.2.
282. See id.; see also Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc., 283 F.3d at 1299-1300. The Blasland court
noted the following:
If the purpose of prejudgment interest is to provide the prevailing party with the time
value of money it should have had at the time it was wronged-to restore the party to an
unwronged position-the only money that [the plaintiff] equitably should have had since
the time it was wronged was the value of the award to it minus the value of [the defen-
dant's] counterclaim award against it. [The plaintiff] is equitably entitled to prejudgment
interest only on the net wrong it suffered, not the gross wrong .... [The plaintiff] is not
entitled to a windfall on its windfall.
Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc., 283 F.3d at 1299-1300.
283. Id. at 1299-1300. See also discussion supra Part I1.B.2.
284. See Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc., 283 F.3d at 1299.
285. Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 212 (8th Cir.
1969).
286. Id. at 213.
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liability and the extent thereof.28 7 To award interest upon the plaintiffs
entire claim confers a windfall to the plaintiff, rewarding it with the use
value of money to which it was never entitled, and in fact, which it owed
to defendant.288
The interest on the balance rule avoids this problem, eliminating a
windfall to either party. 289 Neither party obtains prejudgment interest on
money wrongfully detained and owed to the other party; rather, only
liquidated damages in excess of that claimant's liability are awarded pre-
judgment interest.
Moreover, when both claims arise from the same transaction, op-
erative facts, or contract, the plaintiff would never have access to the
money owed to the defendant. 290 To be sure, both claims are equally de-
mandable at the same point in time irrespective of whether the claim is
characterized as liquidated or unliquidated.2 9 1 It would not make sense,
then, to award a plaintiff compensatory prejudgment interest for money
that was never rightfully the plaintiff s.292 As one state court noted:
A contractor should not be allowed to perform his obligations
poorly, and thus force a purchaser to make expenditures correcting
the shoddy work, and still collect interest on all the monies owed to
him under the contract. Since the contractor should have expended
the money the purchaser paid to repair the purchase, the contractor
should not be entitled to prejudgment interest on that amount. The
money the purchaser properly used to correct the defects in the con-
tractor's work should be viewed as having been paid to the contrac-
tor, thus canceling any debt up to that amount .... It simply would
287. Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 107-08 n.7.
288. See Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 212-13 (throughout the contested period plaintiff was
obligated to defendant and was deprived only of the value of the difference between the two claims).
289. Indu Craft v. Bank of Baroda, No. 87-civ-7379(SHS)(LB), 1995 WL 479516, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995), affd, 87 F.3d 614 (2d Cir. 1996).
290. Ralston Purina Co., 416 F.2d at 212-13 (throughout the contested period plaintiff was
obligated to defendant and was deprived only of the value of the difference between the two claims);
Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 851 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (applied interest on the balance rule
partially because interest on the entire claim rule assumes plaintiffs were denied use of the funds
until judgment).
291. See Prejudgment Interest, supra note 37, at 107-08 n.7 ("[T]he trial was merely an ex
post facto determination of liability"). See also discussion supra Part II.C.
292. This is the converse of the rule that plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest: the
defendant's wrongful detainer of money that was never rightfully hers. See Prejudgment Interest,
supra note 37, at 109. See also Gemini Farms LLC v. Smith-Kern Ellensburg, Inc., 104 Wash. App.
267, 269, 16 P.3d 82, 84 (2001) ("And the amount the seller owes the buyer is not funds it is de-
prived of the rightful use of."); Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981) (awarding setoff
does not award interest on an unliquidated claim; rather, it denies plaintiffs prejudgment interest on
that part of the award that should have been expended in furtherance of their duties).
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not make good sense to charge [debtors] interest on money they do
not owe.
If the plaintiff was not wrongfully deprived of this money, an award
of prejudgment interest on the plaintiff's entire claim effectively confers
a windfall to the plaintiff. 294 The plaintiff is made "more whole" to the
detriment of the defendant in an amount equal to the prejudgment inter-
est awarded above the interest on the balance.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant should be able to receive the
economic benefits of money wrongfully detained throughout trial.295 As a
matter of legal definition, this would amount to unjust enrichment. 296 In
addition, if key functions of prejudgment interest are the promotion of
settlement and the prevention of unjust enrichment, 297 awarding interest
on plaintiffs entire claim would create unjust financial incentives for
plaintiff to delay settlement or slow the litigation process. 298 "Equity and
fairness dictate that interest should be awarded to plaintiff on the net
balance after the setoff.
',299
D. Application of Mall Tool Co. Leads to Absurd Results
The narrow unitary contract requirement, as established in Mall
Tool Co., in many situations leads to absurd results. Although a
defendant-debtor may have a valid reason for withholding payment from
a plaintiff-claimant given the same transaction or occurrence, the
Washington approach would calculate interest upon the plaintiffs entire
293. Hollon, 636 P.2d at 517.
294. For example, at the moment that defendant injures plaintiff, she is liable to the plaintiff for
the damages directly and proximately resulting from the conduct. Defendant then owes the exact
amount of damages to plaintiff at that time. By waiting for a trial to determine liability, defendant
has withheld this money from plaintiff. The money then is rightfully the plaintiff's and the defendant
should not be credited with the use value of this amount. Prejudgment interest compensates for this,
redistributing the use value of money from defendant to plaintiff. Accordingly, when each party has
injured the other party, each party is liable to the other party for the exact amount of damage caused
by their respective conduct. Neither party then should have use of the money, which has been
wrongfully detained from the other party, during the pendency of the trial. See, e.g., Ralston Purina
Co., 416 F.2d at 212-13 (throughout the contested period, plaintiff was obligated to defendant and
was deprived only of the value of the difference between the two claims); Koehler, 614 F. Supp. at
851 (applying interest on the balance rule partially because interest on the entire claim rule assumes
plaintiffs were denied use of the funds until judgment).
295. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
296. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
297. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555 (Tex. 1985) (Kilgarlin, J.
dissenting).
298. See id
299. Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 87-civ-7379(SHS)(LB), 1995 WL 479516, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995) (noting that the Court of Appeals permitted recovery on net balance in
order to avoid a windfall to plaintiff), affd, 87 F.3d 614 (2d Cir. 1996).
Seattle University Law Review
claim despite defendant's valid meritorious, and even more valuable,
counterclaim.
For example, suppose that manufacturer M produces a specialized
widget that is projected to be very profitable. Distributor D supplies
many retail stores various products and is looking for a new product to
reinvigorate its corporation. D contacts M regarding the new and im-
proved specialized widget. M is interested, but is seeking a substantial
wholesale price for the widgets, $50. D is skeptical and, in order to en-
sure that it can cover this cost, requires an exclusive distributor contract
for the widgets throughout all of D's markets and a few others. Pursuant
to this clause, no other corporation or entity may sell or distribute any
widgets from M in this vast area. M agrees and understands, as does D,
that the contract price is predicated on the exclusive distributorship right.
Both terms were freely negotiated and mutually agreed upon. The con-
tract is then signed by both parties and is to be in effect for ten years.
For five years, all goes well; both Mand D enjoy high profit levels.
But, soon thereafter, profits begin to decline. In response to this decline,
D seeks other markets, and M responds accordingly. But believing that D
may not be doing an effective job selling the widgets, M sells 25,000
widgets to D's major distributing competitor C. C is located in, and sells
within, D's region. Not oblivious to this transaction, D refuses to pay for
the latest shipment of 25,000 widgets.30 0 At this point, both parties have
breached the contract: D failed to pay pursuant to the contract, and M
breached the exclusivity clause.30 1
Both parties recognize the other's breach, and soon after the parties
attempt to negotiate a solution. During the next three years, D fails to pay
for the original sum due and subsequent deliveries of the widgets and M
continues to sell widgets to C. Consequently, both parties continue to
breach. Neither initially commences a lawsuit because of the extreme
cost of lawyers and the existence of the other party's claim. D believes it
has a valid claim that is worth more than M's claim because of its pre-
cipitous decline in market share from increased competition. M believes
it has a meritorious claim against D for failure to pay for widgets sold
and delivered.
At the end of the three years,302 all negotiations breakdown and an
angry M brings suit for the value of all widgets sold and delivered since
D's original failure to pay $1,250,000, for a grand total of $3,000,000.
300. 25,000 widgets at $50 each = $1,250,000 due on the contract (not including any other
costs, late fees, taxes, etc.).
301. In fact, Mbreached the contract first.
302. Under Washington law, the statute of limitations for a written contract is six years. WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.16.040(1) (2005).
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Upon receiving the complaint, D promptly counterclaims for the dam-
ages resulting from M's continued breach of the exclusivity clause, alleg-
ing $4,500,000 in damages resulting from the high volumes of special-
ized widgets sold to C over the three years.
At trial, D admits liability for $3,000,000 for widgets sold and de-
livered. Although M contests liability and the extent of damages, after a
jury trial, D's claim for $4,500,000 is meritorious in toto. M then moves
for prejudgment interest. (Assume, hypothetically, the trial lasted two
years from commencement until entry of the verdict).
As an initial matter, M's claim is liquidated-it is easily calculated
based on the written contract and simple arithmetic-and therefore is
subject to an award of prejudgment interest on its own. 30 3 On the other
hand, D's claim for market damages and damages resulting from breach
of the exclusive distributor clause is unliquidated-necessarily entailing
some jury discretion in its calculation-and as a result, is not historically
subject to a prejudgment interest award.30 4 Notwithstanding these facts,
the interest on the balance rule and Washington's interest on the whole
claim rule result in vastly different amounts of awards. Although the in-
terest on the balance approach balances the equities of this case better,
Washington, if faced with this situation, would award M prejudgment
interest on its entire claim prior to deducting D's meritorious claim.3 °5
Relying on Mall Tool Co., a Washington court would award M
$300,000306 even though D's meritorious claim was worth $1,500,000
more than A's claim.30 7 Both claims arose out of the same contract and
even the same operative facts. However, because of the unitary contract
requirement in Washington, the exclusivity clause and the price terms are
understood to be bilateral features of the contract: D never alleged faulty
workmanship or defect by M. 308
303. See discussion supra Part II.C.
304. See id.
305. See generally Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash. 2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
306. A's award = [($3,000,000) + ($3,000,000 * 12% interest * 5 years prejudgment (2 for
trial, 3 for pre-complaint))] - ($4,500,000 defendant counterclaim) = $300,000.
307. Some courts may look to plaintiff's undue delay in bringing suit. In some cases, it has
been held that undue delay would preclude plaintiff from interest on the entire claim. See Blasland,
Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1297-98 (11 th Cir. 2002); Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank v. Wash. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 94 Wash. App. 744, 760-61, 972 P.2d 1282, 1292 (1999) (unex-
plained four year delay between trial court judgment and order for prejudgment interest held unrea-
sonable award). Here, however, there is no evidence of undue delay; in fact, both parties attempted
to reconcile the claims, neither acquiescing in their own claim or maliciously holding out for litiga-
tion. It is also important to note that the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations already await
those who willfully refrain from filing suit. Rothschild, supra note 49, at 212-13.
308. See Mall Tool Co., 45 Wash. 2d at 178-79, 273 P.2d at 664.
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On the other hand, if a Washington court were to use the interest on
the balance rule, Mwould not recover any prejudgment interest. Because
D's counterclaim proved more valuable than M's liquidated claim, noth-
ing remains upon which to calculate interest. 30 9 Accordingly, M is denied
prejudgment interest, and D is awarded $1,500,000.310 Because D's claim
was unliquidated, D does not recover prejudgment interest on any part of
its claim.311 Comparing the two rules, then, the net monetary difference is
$1,800,000.
312
Remembering that their claims arose from the same contract, the
same operative facts, and most importantly, at the same time, under the
interest on the entire claim rule, Mwould effectively receive a substantial
windfall. By the time that D wrongfully withheld payment for widgets
from M, M had already wrongfully breached the contract by supplying C
with 25,000 widgets. At that point, M was liable to D for damages. The
only difference between the two claims is that the jury must determine
the extent of the damage to D.313 Such a decision, however, does not ne-
gate the fact that M wrongfully withheld some amount from D or that D,
at least initially, withheld monies due under the contract in response to
M's breach of the exclusivity clause. The amount of this determination is
irrelevant as M would not have had use of the money during the pend-
ency of the trial anyway. M should not be rewarded for this breach or be
entitled to interest upon amounts that it never lost the use value of be-
cause the money was never M's to begin with.314 Accordingly, the inter-
est on the balance rule is more equitable: by avoiding a windfall to M,
the interest on the balance rule puts both parties in the position they
would have been in at the point when the damages accrued.
E. The Interest on the Whole Rule Is the Minority View When Opposing
Claims Arise from the Same Transaction, Contract, or Operative Facts
Washington's interest on the whole claim rule is a minority rule.315
For some reason, Washington clings to that rule, allowing only a narrow
unitary contract exception where the interest on the balance rule may be
309. Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1960).
310. D's award = $4,500,000 defense verdict- $3,000,000 plaintiff verdict= $1,500,000.
3 11. See discussion supra Part II.C.
312. Net difference = $300,000 for M under Washington law + $1,500,000 for D under the
interest on the balance rule.
313. "[T]he trial was merely an ex post facto determination of liability." Prejudgment Interest,
supra note 37, at 107-08 n.7.
314. See Ralston Purina Co. v. Parsons Feed & Farm Supply, Inc., 416 F.2d 207, 212-13 (8th
Cir. 1969).
315. Local Okla. Bank, N.A. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 713, 723 (2004).
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applied.316 Washington should abandon the unitary contract requirement
and should make interest on the balance the general rule rather than the
exception to the rule when both claims arise from the same transaction,
contract, or operative facts.
Other courts have recognized the difficulty posed by prejudgment
interest. For example, in holding that the law and equities favor the ap-
plication of the interest on the balance rule, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals noted the following:
The appropriate inquiries to be made appear to be two: (1) whether
the "claim for deduction (due to the counterclaim or setoff) could
... be said to be demandable at the time when the original liqui-
dated claim became due and thus, requiring interest on the balance";
or (2) whether the breach of warranty claim was "the proper subject
of a counterclaim for damages (rather) than an offset in the nature
of a ayment," requiring interest to be awarded on the entire
claim.
The court there limited the interest on the entire claim rule to coun-
terclaims that do "not directly concern the plaintiffs claim, that is, when
the unliquidated counterclaim arises out of a collateral matter.",3 18 Central
to this reasoning is the fact that if the two claims arise from the same
general transaction-there two separate contracts-then the plaintiff was
only deprived of the use of the money-a value equal to the difference
between the two claims. 319 In this sense, a related, non-collateral coun-
terclaim functions as an offset in the nature of the payment, thus entitling
a plaintiff-claimant to interest only on the net balance.320
Many jurisdictions outside of Washington, moreover, apply the in-
terest on the balance approach when the claims arise from the same gen-
eral transaction. For example, Nebraska courts have established the
following:
[T]he better rule permits the offset of an unliquidated claim against
a liquidated claim before the computation of interest, at least in
situations in which the two claims arise out of the same general
transaction. "Where a claim under an agreement is certain and liq-
uidated, but is reduced because of the allowance of an unliquidated
316. See discussion supra Part III.A.
317. Giant Food, Inc. v. Jack I. Bender & Sons, 399 A.2d 1293, 1302 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(citations omitted).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1302-03.
320. Id. at 1303.
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off-set or counterclaim, interest may be allowed only on the balance
due. ,'321
Accordingly, Nebraska uses the "same transaction" test for determining
an offset.322
Other courts have framed the inquiry slightly differently, asking
whether the claims are attributable to the same contract.323 The fact that
claims arise from multiple contracts, however, does not change the in-
quiry so long as the unliquidated claims come from the same contracts
forming the basis of the liquidated claims.324 In light of the aforemen-
tioned jurisdictions and analysis, Washington should join the majority of
jurisdictions by abandoning its unitary contract requirement and instead
apply the interest on the balance rule when both the plaintiffs and the
defendant's claims arise from the same transaction, operative facts, or
contract.
V. CONCLUSION
A central theme in American jurisprudence is a commitment to
fully compensate injured parties by restoring them to an unwronged
state. Prejudgment interest is a meaningful part of fully compensating an
injured party. Prejudgment interest offers claimants a means by which
they can be fully compensated and not lose the economic value of money
or property. However, situations arise when a claimant has also caused
damage arising from the same operative facts, transaction, or contract. In
such situations, both injured parties' interests must be taken into
consideration.
The Washington approach to awarding prejudgment interest when a
liquidated claim is offset by an unliquidated counterclaim is too narrow.
As a result, plaintiffs who assert liquidated claims may be overcompen-
sated at the expense of defendants who are also injured but assert unliq-
uidated claims. Washington should abandon the approach laid out in
321. Harmon Cable Commc'ns of Neb. LP v. Scope Cable Television, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 350,
371 (Neb. 1991) (quoting York Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Groussman Inv. Co., 443 P.2d 986, 988
(Colo. 1968)).
322. Harmon Cable Commc 'ns ofNeb. LP, 468 N.W.2d at 371.
323. Homes & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corp., 526 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Ariz. App. 1974)
(noting that it appears to be the "well-recognized rule" that if the amount due under a contract is
ascertainable, but is "reduced by the existence of an unliquidated set-off or counterclaim, attributable
to the contract, interest is properly allowable on the balance found due from the due date.").
324. Hollon v. McComb, 636 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo. 1981) ("[I]f the unliquidated counterclaim
offsets are attributable to the same contracts which are the basis of the primary liquidated claims,
those claims and the unliquidated counterclaims are offset and prejudgment interest is allowed only
on the net difference.") (quoting Fairway Builders, Inc. v. Malouf Towers Rental Co., Inc. 603 P.2d
513 (Ariz. 1979)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Mall Tool Co. and instead follow the majority of jurisdictions and trea-
tises. Washington should generally apply the interest on the balance rule.
The interest on the balance rule more closely approximates the plaintiffs
appropriate compensation while upholding the principles underlying pre-
judgment interest awards. Faced with a meritorious unliquidated coun-
terclaim, a plaintiff asserting a liquidated claim was never deprived of
the use of the amount of the unliquidated counterclaim. To award plain-
tiff interest upon the entire claim when both claims arise out of the same
operative facts or contract awards the plaintiff an unjust and inequitable
windfall in the form of prejudgment interest at the defendant's expense.
If such an approach continues to be followed, Washington courts will
continue to put plaintiffs in a better position through litigation than they
would have occupied had the also-wronged-defendant not breached.
Equity mandates that Washington discard the Mall Tool Co. rule in favor
of the generally recognized interest on the balance rule.
